

# The Political and Moral Economies of Democratic Support

## Online Supplementary Materials

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
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**Table S1.** Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	NAs
Year	–	–	1988	2017	0
Democratic support	.02	.89	-2.10	2.74	0
Log GDP/capita	9.24	1.09	6.02	11.34	0
GDP growth	.03	.07	-1.16	.57	0
Log inflation rate	1.64	1.09	-4.30	8.46	0
Log murder rate	3.71	1.15	1.50	6.98	22
Log infant mortality rate	2.61	1.02	.47	4.81	47
BCI corruption	-.17	1.05	-2.73	1.67	25
Impartial administration	.45	.98	-2.22	2.94	0
SWIID Gini	.37	.09	.19	.62	338
Equal access to power	.49	.80	-1.99	1.65	0
Electoral democracy	.75	.81	-1.41	1.82	0
Liberal democracy	.68	.77	-1.53	1.60	0

**Figure S1.** Regime Types for Country-Years in the Dataset



Dark blue: liberal democracy; light blue: electoral democracy; peach: electoral autocracy; red: closed autocracy.

**Table S2.** Tests of Stationary Time-Series

	Im-Pesharan-Shin Test		Levin-Lin-Chu Test		<i>N</i> Years	<i>N</i> Cntry
	statistic	p-value	statistic	p-value		
Democratic support	-5.446	.000	-4.060	.000	20	62
Log GDP/capita	-5.619	.000	-8.041	.000	20	93
GDP growth	-20.041	.000	-18.885	.000	20	93
Log inflation rate	-15.877	.000	-13.928	.000	20	93
Log murder rate	-9.596	.000	-9.639	.000	20	93
Log infant mortality rate	-2.177	.015	-7.306	.000	20	92
BCI corruption	-7.166	.000	-10.212	.000	20	93
SWIID Gini	-4.667	.000	-7.049	.000	20	60
Equal access to power	-8.513	.000	-8.697	.000	20	93
Impartial governance	-12.436	.000	-5.192	.000	20	93
Electoral democracy	-6.067	.000	-6.501	.000	20	93
Liberalism	-5.695	.000	-7.575	.000	20	93

**Table S3.** Lag Tests

	<i>N</i> Lags			
	0	1	2	3
df	7	8	9	10
AIC	-965.0	-7743.5	-8202.9	-8201.0

**Table S4.** Full Error-Correction Models: Effectiveness

	(1.1)	(1.2)	(1.3)	(1.4)	(1.5)
Intercept	-.068 (.047)	-.054 (.046)	-.014 (.049)	.014 (.066)	-.010 (.062)
Democratic support <sub>t-1</sub>	.472* (.056)	.475* (.056)	.471* (.056)	.471* (.056)	.465* (.056)
Democratic support <sub>t-2</sub>	-.485* (.055)	-.487* (.055)	-.487* (.055)	-.485* (.056)	-.481* (.055)
Electoral democracy <sub>t-1</sub>	.001 (.012)	.000 (.012)	.003 (.012)	.001 (.012)	.004 (.012)
Δ Electoral democracy	-.019 (.026)	-.020 (.026)	-.016 (.026)	-.018 (.026)	-.018 (.026)
Liberalism <sub>t-1</sub>	.002 (.012)	.003 (.012)	-.002 (.011)	.003 (.012)	-.003 (.011)
Δ Liberalism	-.062* (.025)	-.064* (.025)	-.067* (.025)	-.063* (.025)	-.064* (.025)
Log GDP/capita <sub>t-1</sub>	.007 (.005)	.006 (.005)	.004 (.005)	.000 (.006)	.004 (.006)
GDP growth <sub>t-1</sub>	.058 (.062)				.074 (.069)
Δ GDP growth	.124* (.059)				.128* (.062)
Inflation rate <sub>t-1</sub>		-.002 (.003)			.001 (.003)
Δ inflation rate		-.006 (.004)			-.005 (.004)
Murder rate <sub>t-1</sub>			-.007 (.004)		-.007 (.004)
Δ murder rate			-.025 (.044)		-.028 (.044)
Infant mortality rate <sub>t-1</sub>				-.007 (.006)	-.001 (.005)
Δ infant mortality rate				.073 (.078)	.115 (.085)
<i>N</i>	1824	1824	1813	1796	1785

\*  $p < .05$ . Beck-Katz panel corrected standard errors.

**Table S5.** Full Blundell-Bond GMM Models: Effectiveness

	(1.6)	(1.7)	(1.8)	(1.9)	(1.10)
Democratic support <sub><i>t</i>-1</sub>	.466*	.465*	.445*	.454*	.441*
	(.030)	(.031)	(.034)	(.034)	(.034)
Democratic support <sub><i>t</i>-2</sub>	-.507*	-.506*	-.508*	-.502*	-.502*
	(.030)	(.030)	(.032)	(.030)	(.032)
Electoral democracy <sub><i>t</i>-1</sub>	.029*	.026	.029	.019	.027
	(.014)	(.015)	(.016)	(.015)	(.014)
Δ Electoral democracy	-.005	-.007	.003	-.006	.000
	(.024)	(.024)	(.026)	(.024)	(.025)
Liberalism <sub><i>t</i>-1</sub>	.004	.002	-.010	.005	-.009
	(.012)	(.013)	(.016)	(.014)	(.015)
Δ Liberalism	-.058*	-.061*	-.061*	-.052*	-.056*
	(.026)	(.026)	(.027)	(.026)	(.026)
Log GDP/capita <sub><i>t</i>-1</sub>	-.003*	-.002	.007*	.002	.008*
	(.001)	(.001)	(.002)	(.001)	(.002)
GDP growth <sub><i>t</i>-1</sub>	-.023				.020
	(.064)				(.073)
Δ GDP growth	.067				.090
	(.050)				(.047)
Inflation rate <sub><i>t</i>-1</sub>		-.007*			.002
		(.003)			(.004)
Δ inflation rate		-.008*			-.003
		(.004)			(.004)
Murder rate <sub><i>t</i>-1</sub>			-.021*		-.021*
			(.006)		(.006)
Δ murder rate			-.001		-.013
			(.042)		(.041)
Infant mortality rate <sub><i>t</i>-1</sub>				-.013*	-.001
				(.004)	(.005)
Δ infant mortality rate				.193	.267*
				(.107)	(.115)
<i>N</i>	2026	2026	2026	2026	2026

\*  $p < .05$ . Windmeijer-corrected standard errors.

**Table S6.** Full Error-Correction Models: Impartiality and Inequality

	(2.1)	(2.2)	(2.3)	(2.4)	(2.5)
Intercept	-.006 (.049)	-.023 (.049)	-.030 (.051)	-.065 (.047)	-.011 (.059)
Democratic support <sub>t-1</sub>	.459* (.058)	.465* (.056)	.465* (.058)	.463* (.056)	.442* (.061)
Democratic support <sub>t-2</sub>	-.475* (.057)	-.481* (.055)	-.478* (.057)	-.479* (.055)	-.463* (.059)
Electoral democracy <sub>t-1</sub>	.004 (.012)	-.006 (.013)	-.001 (.012)	-.007 (.014)	-.014 (.015)
Δ Electoral democracy	-.017 (.026)	-.027 (.026)	-.017 (.031)	-.020 (.026)	-.027 (.032)
Liberalism <sub>t-1</sub>	-.008 (.012)	-.009 (.012)	.006 (.012)	-.001 (.011)	-.007 (.013)
Δ Liberalism	-.067* (.025)	-.072* (.025)	-.071* (.031)	-.063* (.025)	-.086* (.031)
Log GDP/capita <sub>t-1</sub>	.000 (.005)	.002 (.005)	.004 (.005)	.006 (.005)	.000 (.006)
GDP growth <sub>t-1</sub>	.048 (.064)	.050 (.062)	.030 (.064)	.059 (.062)	.018 (.065)
Δ GDP growth	.115 (.059)	.117* (.059)	.147* (.064)	.123* (.058)	.141* (.064)
BCI corruption <sub>t-1</sub>	-.013* (.004)				-.010* (.004)
Δ BCI corruption	.009 (.045)				.025 (.054)
Impartial admin <sub>t-1</sub>		.018* (.006)			.007 (.006)
Δ impartial admin		.027 (.019)			.020 (.021)
Income inequality <sub>t-1</sub>			-.046 (.048)		.022 (.050)
Δ income inequality			-1.483 (.845)		-1.623 (.829)
Power distribution <sub>t-1</sub>				.018* (.008)	.021* (.009)
Δ Power distribution				.011 (.020)	.015 (.022)
<i>N</i>	1815	1824	1654	1824	1645

\**p* < .05. Beck-Katz panel corrected standard errors.



**Table S7.** Full Blundell-Bond GMM Models: Effectiveness

	(2.6)	(2.7)	(2.8)	(2.9)	(2.10)
Democratic support <sub><i>t</i>-1</sub>	.440*	.443*	.448*	.442*	.420*
	(.033)	(.033)	(.036)	(.033)	(.036)
Democratic support <sub><i>t</i>-2</sub>	-.494*	-.496*	-.501*	-.497*	-.475*
	(.027)	(.029)	(.032)	(.031)	(.031)
Electoral democracy <sub><i>t</i>-1</sub>	.025*	.007	.025	.014	-.004
	(.013)	(.013)	(.016)	(.013)	(.015)
Δ Electoral democracy	-.003	-.022	.003	-.005	-.014
	(.023)	(.024)	(.030)	(.024)	(.031)
Liberalism <sub><i>t</i>-1</sub>	-.018	-.021	.006	-.003	-.018
	(.014)	(.015)	(.016)	(.013)	(.014)
Δ Liberalism	-.065*	-.072*	-.059	-.059*	-.086*
	(.027)	(.029)	(.031)	(.027)	(.034)
Log GDP/capita <sub><i>t</i>-1</sub>	-.001	-.001	.004	-.004*	-.002
	(.001)	(.001)	(.002)	(.001)	(.002)
GDP growth <sub><i>t</i>-1</sub>	-.010	-.021	-.024	-.030	-.019
	(.061)	(.065)	(.069)	(.076)	(.064)
Δ GDP growth	.079	.068	.093	.058	.109*
	(.048)	(.051)	(.054)	(.051)	(.051)
BCI corruption <sub><i>t</i>-1</sub>	-.030*				-.021*
	(.009)				(.008)
Δ BCI corruption	.048				.069
	(.049)				(.053)
Impartial admin <sub><i>t</i>-1</sub>		.043*			.011
		(.015)			(.011)
Δ impartial admin		.036*			.016
		(.017)			(.020)
Income inequality <sub><i>t</i>-1</sub>			-.163*		.008
			(.056)		(.041)
Δ income inequality			-1.224		-1.476
			(.777)		(.824)
Power distribution <sub><i>t</i>-1</sub>				.044*	.037*
				(.012)	(.011)
Δ Power distribution				.023	.024
				(.020)	(.022)
<i>N</i>	2026	2026	2026	2026	2026

\**p* < .05. Windmeijer-corrected standard errors.

**Table S8.** Effects of Alternative Indicators of Effectiveness: Calorie Supply and Employment Rate

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	-.041 (.065)	-.081 (.045)		
Democratic support <sub>t-1</sub>	.488* (.071)	.468* (.056)	.484* (.031)	.455* (.032)
Democratic support <sub>t-2</sub>	-.503* (.070)	-.481* (.056)	-.508* (.034)	-.507* (.031)
Electoral democracy <sub>t-1</sub>	-.002 (.012)	.000 (.012)	.010 (.017)	.037* (.017)
Δ Electoral democracy	-.053 (.041)	-.020 (.027)	-.046 (.047)	-.001 (.024)
Liberalism <sub>t-1</sub>	.005 (.013)	.003 (.012)	.007 (.011)	.004 (.014)
Δ Liberalism	-.074* (.036)	-.060* (.026)	-.071 (.040)	-.053* (.027)
Log GDP/capita <sub>t-1</sub>	.005 (.007)	.007 (.005)	-.002 (.004)	-.003 (.003)
Calorie supply <sub>t-1</sub>	-.002 (.013)		.000 (.010)	
Δ calorie supply	-.016 (.054)		-.020 (.039)	
Employment rate <sub>t-1</sub>		.024 (.035)		-.013 (.033)
Δ employment rate		.412 (.225)		.363 (.264)
<i>N</i> observations	1225	1774	2026	2026
<i>N</i> countries	101	101	101	101
<i>N</i> instruments			95	95
Residual standard error	.103	.097		
Breusch-Godfrey AR(1) test (p-value)	.489	.542		
Hansen test (p-value)			.767	.494
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test (p-value)			.422	.957

\* $p < .05$ . EC models include Beck-Katz panel corrected standard errors; System GMM models include Windmeijer-corrected standard errors.

**Table S9.** Effects of Alternative Indicators of Corruption: V-Dem and Transparency International Corruption Indices

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	-.007 (.052)	.008 (.052)		
Democratic support <sub>t-1</sub>	.463* (.056)	.434* (.062)	.438* (.035)	.413* (.034)
Democratic support <sub>t-2</sub>	-.478* (.055)	-.450* (.062)	-.495* (.030)	-.471* (.032)
Electoral democracy <sub>t-1</sub>	-.003 (.013)	.001 (.013)	.016 (.013)	.015 (.014)
Δ electoral democracy	-.019 (.025)	-.016 (.028)	-.009 (.023)	-.007 (.024)
Liberalism <sub>t-1</sub>	-.011 (.011)	-.011 (.013)	-.022 (.015)	-.018 (.016)
Δ liberalism	-.064* (.026)	-.064* (.027)	-.062* (.027)	-.059 (.030)
Log GDP/capita <sub>t-1</sub>	.001 (.005)	-.001 (.005)	-.001 (.001)	-.001 (.001)
GDP growth <sub>t-1</sub>	.056 (.063)	.062 (.069)	-.006 (.066)	.002 (.069)
Δ GDP growth	.119* (.059)	.113 (.062)	.073 (.051)	.075 (.052)
V-Dem corruption <sub>t-1</sub>	-.016* (.005)		-.034* (.013)	
Δ V-Dem corruption	.017 (.025)		.000 (.022)	
TI corruption <sub>t-1</sub>		-.016* (.004)		-.036* (.010)
Δ TI corruption		-.008 (.007)		-.018* (.007)
<i>N</i> observations	1824	1656	3547	3203
<i>N</i> countries	101	101	101	101
<i>N</i> instruments			99	99
Residual standard error	.096	.098		
Breusch-Godfrey AR(1) test (p-value)	.625	.844		
Hansen test (p-value)			.408	.381
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test (p-value)			.944	.552

\* $p < .05$ . EC models include Beck-Katz panel corrected standard errors; System GMM models include Windmeijer-corrected standard errors.

**Table S10.** Models of Effectiveness Using Full Sample of Democracies and Autocracies

	Error-Correction Models					Blundell-Bond GMM Models				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
GDP growth democracies $_{t-1}$	-.003 (.071)	-.004 (.003)	-.006 (.004)	-.006 (.007)	.004 (.075)	-.047 (.070)				-.052 (.075)
GDP growth autocracies $_{t-1}$	.129* (.065)				.128 (.067)	.101 (.073)				.091 (.075)
$\Delta$ GDP growth democracies	.054 (.054)				.051 (.055)	.049 (.052)				.050 (.056)
$\Delta$ GDP growth autocracies	.020 (.047)				.018 (.049)	.015 (.031)				.013 (.032)
Inflation rate democracies $_{t-1}$		-.004 (.003)			-.002 (.003)		-.007 (.004)			-.004 (.004)
$\Delta$ inflation rate democracies		-.008 (.004)			-.006 (.004)		-.008 (.004)			-.006 (.004)
Inflation rate autocracies $_{t-1}$		.002 (.005)			.002 (.005)		.002 (.004)			-.000 (.005)
$\Delta$ inflation rate autocracies		-.000 (.004)			-.002 (.005)		-.000 (.003)			-.003 (.003)
Murder rate democracies $_{t-1}$			-.006 (.004)		-.006 (.004)			-.020* (.006)		-.021* (.007)
$\Delta$ murder rate democracies			-.042 (.029)		-.043 (.029)			-.034 (.033)		-.040 (.034)
Murder rate autocracies $_{t-1}$			-.002 (.004)		-.002 (.004)			-.000 (.006)		-.003 (.007)
$\Delta$ murder rate autocracies			-.003 (.028)		-.006 (.028)			.010 (.027)		-.000 (.027)
Infant mortality rate democracies $_{t-1}$				-.006 (.007)	.001 (.006)				-.015 (.011)	.008 (.012)
$\Delta$ infant mortality rate democracies				.022 (.071)	.041 (.074)			.089 (.093)		.095 (.094)
Infant mortality rate autocracies $_{t-1}$				.003 (.008)	.003 (.008)			.005 (.006)		.006 (.008)
$\Delta$ infant mortality rate autocracies				.044 (.070)	.059 (.073)			.123 (.093)		.121 (.094)
<i>N</i> observations	2271	2271	2260	2231	2220	4408	4408	4386	4329	4307
<i>N</i> countries	134	134	134	133	133	134	134	134	133	133

\*  $p < .05$ . EC models include Beck-Katz panel corrected standard errors; System GMM models include Windmeijer-corrected standard errors.

**Table S11.** Models of Impartiality and Inequality Using Full Sample of Democracies and Autocracies

	Error-Correction Models				Blundell-Bond GMM Models					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
BCI corruption democracies <sub><i>t-1</i></sub>	-.012* (.004)				-.008 (.004)	-.031* (.012)				-.022* (.009)
Δ BCI corruption democracies	-.020 (.041)				-.017 (.054)	-.002 (.046)				.015 (.050)
BCI corruption autocracies <sub><i>t-1</i></sub>	.005 (.008)				.007 (.010)	.005 (.008)				.005 (.013)
Δ BCI corruption autocracies	.036 (.044)				.039 (.057)	.061 (.048)				.077 (.052)
Impartial admin democracies <sub><i>t-1</i></sub>		.017* (.005)			.008 (.006)		.036* (.013)			.009 (.012)
Δ impartial admin democracies		.046* (.018)			.038 (.020)		.054* (.016)			.032 (.020)
Impartial admin autocracies <sub><i>t-1</i></sub>		.001 (.009)			.001 (.013)		.004 (.008)			.012 (.016)
Δ impartial admin autocracies		.044* (.018)			.027 (.027)		.040 (.025)			.027 (.027)
Income inequality democracies <sub><i>t-1</i></sub>			-.049 (.051)		.009 (.052)			-.145 (.075)		-.023 (.057)
Δ income inequality democracies			-2.023* (.814)		-1.994* (.806)			-1.782* (.711)		-1.841* (.719)
Income inequality autocracies <sub><i>t-1</i></sub>			.008 (.083)		.054 (.089)			.052 (.089)		.087 (.095)
Δ income inequality autocracies			-1.757* (.795)		-1.700* (.795)			-1.398 (.723)		-1.452* (.721)
Power distribution democracies <sub><i>t-1</i></sub>				.018* (.009)	.019 (.011)				.042* (.011)	.036* (.011)
Δ power distribution democracies				.041 (.021)	.038 (.023)				.051* (.023)	.045 (.025)
Power distribution autocracies <sub><i>t-1</i></sub>				.009 (.006)	.012 (.008)				.012 (.009)	.019 (.011)
Δ power distribution autocracies				.018 (.019)	-.003 (.023)				.021 (.019)	.007 (.022)
<i>N</i> observations	2257	2271	1957	2271	1944	4380	4408	3794	4408	3768
<i>N</i> countries	134	134	120	134	120	134	134	120	134	120

\* *p* < .05. EC models include Beck-Katz panel corrected standard errors; System GMM models include Windmeijer-corrected standard errors.

**Table S12. Models of Political Equality**

	Error- Correction Model	Blundell- Bond GMM Model
Intercept	.072 (.087)	
Political equality <sub><i>t</i>-1</sub>	-.142 (.084)	-.123* (.032)
Political equality <sub><i>t</i>-2</sub>	.091 (.080)	.104* (.036)
Electoral democracy <sub><i>t</i>-1</sub>	.049* (.016)	.028 (.030)
Δ electoral democracy	.225* (.042)	.223* (.079)
Liberalism <sub><i>t</i>-1</sub>	-.014 (.014)	-.013 (.013)
Δ liberalism	.142* (.051)	.143* (.061)
Log GDP/capita <sub><i>t</i>-1</sub>	-.003 (.006)	.001 (.003)
GDP growth <sub><i>t</i>-1</sub>	-.018 (.078)	-.017 (.085)
Δ GDP growth	.005 (.074)	.016 (.069)
Income inequality <sub><i>t</i>-1</sub>	-.129 (.097)	-.038 (.065)
Δ income inequality	-1.872* (.873)	-2.110* (1.020)
BCI corruption <sub><i>t</i>-1</sub>	-.002 (.003)	.001 (.003)
Δ BCI corruption	-.036 (.068)	-.033 (.057)
<i>N</i> observations	1645	2026

\* $p < .05$ . Dependent variable is V-Dem measure of political equal (“equal access”). EC models include Beck-Katz panel corrected standard errors; System GMM models include Windmeijer-corrected standard errors.